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TBringing Together That Which Belongs Together1:
The Establishment of KwaNdebele and the Incorporation of Moutse'
Derrick Nielsen
(Brasenose College, Oxford University)
Down the years your people have remained loyal to their language and their culture,
thus ensuring that they were not swallowed up by other black peoples, so that today
they can maintain themselves as a nation in its own right within its own territory. ...
Through the large-scale migration of your people to their own country, the Ndebele
nation is bringing together that which belongs together.
— Marais Viljoen, State President of South Africa, speaking at the first
session of the KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly
... it was not the population composition of the inhabitants of Moutse which resulted
in the incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele. There is absolutely no indication
that the State President was motivated by a desire to add the South Ndebele of
Moutse to their brothers in KwaNdebele. ... The motives were administrative - a
larger continuous area can be more easily administered than separate areas under
different administrations.
— From the judgment in the case of Mathebe v the Governments of the
Republic of South Africa, of KwaNdebele and of Lebowa, Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court (1988).
Introduction
Through a series of public statements and official proclamations issued in the early 1980s, the
South African government confirmed that KwaNdebele, a small peri-urban settlement northeast
of Pretoria, was to become the fifth 'independent homeland' in the country.1 One of the smallest
and poorest of Pretoria's territorial constructs, the Department of Co-operation and
Development planned to boost the area's viability by incorporating the historically non-Ndebele
area of Moutse, originally a part of Lebowa, into KwaNdebele before granting independence.
From 1985 until the end of the decade, both Moutse and KwaNdebele witnessed periods of
popular revolt and mass mobilization against aspects of the government's bantustan policy, in
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particular against plans calling for the consolidation, development and eventual independence of
KwaNdebele.2
As conflict engulfed the KwaNdebele region in 1985-6, the parliamentary opposition, political
NGOs and a wide-range of journalists and commentators questioned both the objectives and the
tactics of the Botha government.3 For many, Moutse's incorporation and KwaNdebele's
independence represented, in a vivid and tragic manner, the illogical nature of government
policy. When Allister Sparks headed one of his columns with the question "What on earth is the
Government playing at in KwaNdebele?" he was voicing a wide-spread sense of frustration and
disbelief.4 However, despite the urgency which the revolts' bloodshed had added, the substance
of Sparks' rhetorical question was not new. KwaNdebele has frequently been cited as an
example of the ridiculous lengths to which the previous government was willing to go in the
pursuit of ethnic purity. In such accounts, KwaNdebele's belated establishment represents the
last step in a long, and illogical, process of ethnic partition. Sparks summarized KwaNdebele's
creation thus:
It was formed by buying up 19 white farms,, building an instant capital called
Siyabuswa, finding a compliant member of the Ndebele tribe named Simon Skosana
who was wining to play ban, making him Chief Minister of a nominated legislative
assembly, then, on his say-so, declaring that the 'people' of KwaNdebele had opted
for independence.
In addition, Sparks questioned the logic of Moutse's incorporation:
I would like someone to give me one sensible reason for what has been done. The
annexation does not even make sense in terms of the Government's own ideology.
The people of Moutse are Sotho-speaking members of the Pedi tribe. According to
the logic of apartheid's insistence on ethnic compartmentalization, they should form
part of the North Sotho "homeland' of Lebowa. But the Government has removed
them from Lebowa and forced them to join the "homeland' for the Ndebele. Why?
What follows is an attempt to answer Sparks' query. The primary objective of this paper is to
construct a narrative of events which tracks government policy towards the Ndebele from their
initial scattered existence across the Transvaal, to the belated creation and consolidation of
KwaNdebele and, finally, to the incorporation of the primarily non-Ndebele area of Moutse.
Throughout, I will adopt a top-down approach in order to view events and the region from the
perspective of the South African government, and more specifically, from the perspective of
officials involved in formulating homeland policy.5
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The account which emerges challenges many of the assumptions which have been made
regarding the government's policy towards the Ndebele. Most importantly, the narrative
suggests that the South African government was never, despite its rhetoric, primarily concerned
to consolidate an ethnic 'unit'. KwaNdebele's establishment and its consolidation was not driven
by an ethnographer's vision or, even by a drvide-and-rule plan. Although elements of each were
involved, the creation of an Ndebele homeland primarily reflected an attempt by government
planners to manage the effects of emerging economic and political dynamics in the region.
Following its creation, ethnic criteria were similarly downplayed in planning for the fledgling
bantustan's growth and development. Through a series of government commissions and internal
departmental proposals the 'separate development' ideal of a 'national unit' was increasingly
ignored in favor of geographical, administrative and developmental concerns. This unstated, but
clearly discernible, shift in government policy culminated in the government's forced
incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele.
To understand the context in which these policies were formulated, it is necessary to begin with
a brief review of the history of the Ndebele. As we shall see, government policy was informed
by the material and political impact of past events.
The Transvaal Ndebele in Historical Perspective
In light of the upheavals which the creation and consolidation of KwaNdebele eventually
caused, it is ironic to note that the South African government was historically slow to warm to
the notion of a separate Ndebele homeland. Despite the Ndebele's reputed cultural
conservatism (which some have claimed is evident in their distinctive wall-paintings and
beadwork6), the ideologues of apartheid consistently left the Ndebele out of emerging plans for
an ethnically partitioned South Africa. In 1959, the government did not recognize the group as
a 'national unit' deserving of a territorial authority in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act, the legislative basis for the government's new "ethnic" approach to bantustan
development. At the time, the Transvaal Ndebele, descendants of one of the first Nguni groups
to cross the Vaal river, were spread across the length and breadth of the province.7 Pockets of
Ndebele could be found living together on land under the jurisdiction of the Bophuthatswana
and Lebowa homelands, although most were still dispersed in small family clusters on the white
farms of the region. Still others had been drawn into regional labor markets, either as migrant
workers in the PWV or, like those Irving in Doomkop near Middelburg, as residents of 'black
spots' near smaller towns. The dispersion of the Ndebele across the region was the result of a
combination of internal and external pressures.8
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The Transvaal Ndebele have historically split at least twice due to fissions internal to the group.
The first division occurred at a very early stage, probably not long after the group's arrival in the
Transvaal. While the reasons for the split are unknown, we do know that part of the Ndebele
migrated north, eventually settling amongst the Sotho-speaking population near present-day
Pietersburg, while the remainder continued to live in the original Ndebele heartland of
KwaMnyamana ('place of the black hills', later known as Bon Accord, located north of present-
day Pretoria). This division is the basis for what has become a linguistic and socio-cultural
division between the so-called Northern Ndebele, who have largely assimilated the language and
customs of their Northern Sotho neighbors, and the Southern Ndebele whose speech and
culture still display Nguni characteristics.
The Southern Ndebele subsequently endured a split of their own. According to oral tradition,
before the difaqane, a succession dispute between two royal heirs sparked division within the
Ndebele living in the KwaMnyamana heartland. In a story strikingly reminiscent of the Biblical
tale of Jacob and Esau, it is said that Ndzundza, the younger son of the dying chief Musi,
deceitfully deprived his elder brother Manala of the royal regalia. According to tradition,
Ndzundza and his followers were chased from the area, eventually settling east of the Steelpoort
River. Henceforward, the two branches of the Southern Ndebele, named after the brothers who
occasioned the split, lived in peace, separated by over a hundred kilometers, and developed
separately.
Both branches of the Southern Ndebele suffered heavily at the hands of Mzilikazi's regiments
during the 1820s. The Manala were, in fact, nearly annihilated and, following another
succession dispute, were divided into three separate small 'tribes'. First attacked and then
divided, the majority of the Manala were forced, over the next fifty years, to seek refuge on the
Wallmansthal mission station or live on the farms of local Boers in exchange for their labor.
The Ndzundza, however, regrouped after the difaqane, and under the protection of the
Maroteng (Pedi) paramountcy, established themselves as a regional power in the fortified
strongholds of KoNomtjharhelo, near present-day Roossenekal. However, like the other
Ajfrican chiefdoms in the area, the Ndzundza were eventually defeated and subjugated to white
rule in 1883, after a long period of struggle against both Boer and British forces.
It is important to note that the defeat of the Ndzundza and the 'peace' which followed were
perhaps unique in southern Africa for the hardship which they imposed. With a view towards
lessening the reconstituted Z.A.R.'s dual problems of landlessness and shortage of labor, the
Ndzundza who survived the eight-month siege were distributed among the Boer commandos as
indentured servants. All of their land was subsequently divided into seven hectare plots and
rushed by commando veterans on a first-come, first-served basis. As a result, the population of
the once formidable Ndzundza chiefdom was scattered as virtual slave-labor across the districts
The Transvaa! Ndebele in Historical Context," unpublished. See also, Peter Delius, 'The Ndzundza
Ndebele: Indenture and the Making of Ethnic Identity," in P. Bonner, et a!., eds., Holding Their Ground
(Johannesburg: Wits University Press and Ravan Press, 1989) and Deborah James, "Kinship and
Land In An Inter-Ethnic Rural Community," unpub. MA thesis, (Johannesburg: University of the
Witwatersrand, 1987), especially pp. 44-61.
of central and eastern Transvaal and their land, ironically still referred to as Mapochsgronden,9
was alienated.
Originally indentured for five years, the defeat of the Ndzundza in 1883 in fact began a period of
dispossession that lasted into the modern era. The official period of indenture preceded decades
of informal indenture, coerced labor tenancy and harsh share-cropping arrangements.
Furthermore, the chief and twenty-two other traditional leaders of the Ndzundza were
imprisoned after the war of 1883. Thus deprived of both land and leadership, the Ndzundza
entered the twentieth-century perhaps uniquely disadvantaged among the Transvaal's African
population.
Although various government commissions of the mid- to late-1910s failed to meet Ndebele
requests for their own land, small groups of Ndzundza were nevertheless beginning to gather,
on their own impetus, around two traditional leaders hi two separate areas of the Transvaal.
By 1923, Mayisha Cornelius Mahlangu, the grandson of the last independent paramount, was
living with a group of Ndzundza on the farm Weltevreden, north and east of Pretoria. The
purchase of the farm was secured with assistance from the other main cluster of Ndzundza
living under Matsitsi, the brother of the former paramount, near Kafferskraal Before settling at
Weltevreden, the Ndzundza, hi an act with future significance, offered cattle to the area's
established Bantoane chief before taking possession of the land.10
In 1939, the Ndzundza at Kafferskraal, moved north across the Blood River to Trust farms
located east of Groblersdal in the Nebo district. The move, led by Matsitsi's son, Jonas,
foreshadowed the eventual political break between the two Ndzundza communities. Although
tension between the two groups, and especially between the traditional leaders of the two
branches, had been apparent for some time, a definite split only occurred in the apartheid era.
Predictably, given the history above, the final confrontation centered around the emotive issue
of land.
Until the 1950s, it appears that both branches of the Ndzundza considered the return to
Mapochsgronden a sine qua non for further negotiations with the government. However, in
1959, the Nebo Ndzundza, under the regent chief Jack Mahlangu, decided to accept recognition
as a tribal authority within the larger, primarily Northern Sotho-speaking Nebo regional
authority. Implicitly, Mahlangu's decision relinquished Ndzundza claims - or at least those of
the Nebo branch - on the historical Ndebele heartland east of the Steelpoort River. David
Mabhogo, the chief of the Ndzundza living on Weltevreden, was furious. Having rejected a
similar offer for recognition,11 Chief Mabhogo personally traveled to Nebo in an attempt to fine
and, thereby, discipline Jack Mahlangu, whom Mabhogo, as the historically senior Ndzundza
9
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chie£ considered an upstart "headman". The ensuing confrontation confirmed the political split
between the Ndzundza branches. Although social interaction between members of the two
groups continued, the communities' political and traditional elites remained wary of each other.
Nearly a decade later, in 1968, Chief Mabhogo finally accepted the installation of the Ndzundza
Tribal Authority (NTA) in the Weltevreden area. Despite holding out nearly a decade longer
than the Nebo Ndzundza, the Weltevreden Ndzundza were not allowed to return to
Mapochsgronden. Like their counterparts in Nebo, they were instead simply incorporated into
the neighboring Northern Sotho homeland of Lebowa. By this time, three other Ndebele
authorities had been established in the Hammanskraal region of Bophuthatswana, consisting
primarily of Manala Ndebele. In addition, several Northern Ndebele authorities had been
established in both Lebowa and Bophuthatswana. Outside of these structures, a considerable
number of Ndebele remained in precarious positions on white farms throughout the region.
Thus, by the late 1960s, over eighty years after their dispersal from Mapochsgronden, the
Ndebele remained politically divided, economically weak and geographically dispersed. At this
stage, the government seems to have hoped that the scattered Ndebele would integrate into
neighboring "black nations" and thereby "disappear".l2
The Establishment of KwaNdebele
However, in what appears an abrupt about-face, officials of BAD met with the leaders of
various Ndebele tribal authorities in March 1972 in order to discuss, for the first time, the
possibility of creating an Ndebele homeland. Six months later, draft plans for such an area were
released. Several interpretations of this shift in government policy have been offered. As we
shall see, prominent Ndebele leaders and government officials have offered complimentary
accounts of KwaNdebele's creation. They differ, however, in the emphasis accorded to the
demands of various sectors of the population. After summarizing both of these accounts, I will
conclude the section by developing a third interpretation which stresses larger political and
material processes behind the government's decision to create an Ndebele homeland.
As one might expect, the elite of KwaNdebele have stressed the effect that they and other
Ndebele leaders had in demonstrating to the South African government the need for such a
homeland. The activities of various Ndebele organizations formed in the late 1960s have been
frequently cited by the leaders as proof of the depth and breadth of popular support for the
cause. The earliest of these organizations, the Ndebele Ethnic Group, was established in
Atteridgeville and Mamelodi in 1965 in response to Radio Bantu's lack of siNdebele programs.
This initial group was limited in scope, but it was soon absorbed into a larger, more ambitious
structure, the Transvaal National Ndebele Organization (TNNO). Founded in Mamelodi in
November 1967, the TNNO originally targeted the Ndebele residents of Pretoria's and
Germiston's townships for mobilization. However, in April 1968, at a Daveyton meeting held to
draft a constitution for the organization, the organization's mission was broadened to include the
unification of the various branches of the Transvaal Ndebele. By the time of the TNNO's first
conference, held in Mamelodi from August 31 to September 1, 1968, the organization was
explicitly calling for discussions with the relevant government ministers regarding the
1 2
 Die Volksblad (16 Mar 79), cited in Colleen McCaul, Satellite in Revolt - KwaNdebele: An
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establishment of their own homeland. Speakers at a second conference, held near
Hammanskraal in March 1969, repeated the organization's demands for government action,13
After the installation of the NTA in 1968, the Weltevreden elite became particularly active in
rallying support for a homeland. Simon Skosana (at the time chairman of the NTA and a
member of the TNNO, and later Chief Minister of KwaNdebele) recalls that he "started to move
among the Ndebele people with a bicycle in 1967 and 1968 to try and organize them."14 David
Mabhogo, the respected paramount of the Ndzundza, played an important role in securing the
participation of other Ndebele chiefs. Visits by Mabhogo to the Manala chief William Mabena
and to the Northern Ndebele chief Johannes Kekana in April 1968 consolidated elite support for
a common homeland.15
In short, members of the Ndzundza elite, like Skosana and Mabhogo, have stressed the role
which Ndebele organizations and their leaders played in forcing the government to listen to their
demands. As Skosana has summarized, "There was a very big argument about it [an Ndebele
homeland]. It took us from 1968 to 1972. Then they started to answer us."16 For the
Ndzundza elite, the eventual creation of an Ndebele homeland around the 1)lack spot' of
Weltevreden, a farm which their forebears had purchased with great effort, must have seemed,
at least in part, a personal triumph. Later, the KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly (KLA)
recalled the achievement when selecting the bantustan's motto: "Kuvuswa ezivusako" which
translates as "You help those who help themselves".17
This interpretation of events has, at times, been reinforced by members of the South African
government. Official documents and government press releases sometimes cite the persistent
requests of Ndebele leaders as an important catalyst for the creation of KwaNdebele. For
instance, an article commissioned by the KwaNdebele National Development Corporation states
that KwaNdebele "is a paradox of sorts" among the country's bantustans. The article suggests
that although the homelands "were conceived by Pretoria's strategic planners ... the self-
governing territory of KwaNdebele was born of the Ndebele people's self-motivated desire to
stake out their piece of South Africa."18
However, more often than not, government officials have relied on the rhetoric of ethnic
nationalism, rather than the requests of Ndebele elites, to justify the homeland's belated creation.
Marais Viljoen's statement to the opening session of the KLA, quoted at the beginning of this
paper, is a particularly dramatic example of this technique. In his speech, the State President19
praised the "surging nationalism of the Ndebele nation," comparing its "flame of nationalism"
with the spirit found elsewhere in independent Africa. "How could it be wrong," he asked, "for
the government of South Africa to acknowledge the human desire for unfettered freedom." He
continued, claiming that "through the large-scale migration of your people to their own country,
the Ndebele nation is bringing together that which belongs together."20
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In fact, Marais1 last observation regarding the influx of people into KwaNdebele demonstrates
the tactic most frequently employed by the government to justify the bantustan's creation.
Citing the area's incredible statistics on migration and settlement,21 government officials claimed
that a separate Ndebele homeland was not only possible, but represented a positive development
for the masses hi accordance with their own demands. In short, the government portrayed
influx into the area as a physical manifestation of self-determination. According to this
interpretation, thousands of people had voted with then" feet in the process of "bringing together
that which belong[ed] together" - an ethnic Ndebele nation.22
However, what both of these interpretations obscure, and what is central to the explanation
which I now want to suggest, is the fact that the provision of land for Ndebele settlement was in
fact becoming increasingly necessary from the perspective of the South African government
itself. By the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, changes hi the political economy
of the central Transvaal region had important ramifications for rural Africans. In particular, the
mechanization of farm production and the switch to capital-intensive crops forced many African
laborers, and their families, off the land hi search of other places to live and work. Legislation
restricting squatting and providing for the abolition of tenant-farming confirmed and intensified
the displacement of Africans living on white-owned farms throughout the area. Constrained by
the tightening of influx control measures hi the cities, many displaced families had no option
other than to seek refuge in the bantustan to which they were said to belong according to the
apartheid schema.23
For displaced Ndebele, the situation was particularly severe. Without an officially designated
"home" to which to return, Ndebele leaving the farms had two basic options in the search for
land. First, they could acquire their own plots or, more frequently, become tenants on
residential stands in existing Ndebele areas. The two most promising areas for occupation,
particularly for the Southern Ndebele, were the twenty-three trust farms of Jack Mahlangu in
Nebo and Mabhogo's farms around Weltevreden. Alternatively, others sought refuge in the
nearby homelands of Bophuthatswana or Lebowa. Winterveld, a series of freehold farms hi the
Odi-Moretele region of Bophuthatswana was a particularly frequent destination hi the early
1970s.
Yet the economic displacement of a large number of Ndebele from white-owned farms does not,
by itself explain why the government chose to reverse previous policy regarding an Ndebele
homeland. Without changing its policy, the government could have simply added more land to
existing Ndebele areas in order to ease land pressure, while maintaining these areas within the
boundaries of the existing bantustans. In fact, several farms around Weltevreden were
21
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incorporated in this manner into the NTA's jurisdiction in 1972. We must look elsewhere, then,
for additional factors which contributed to the government's need to create a separate Ndebele
bantustan.
I will argue that aspects of the South African government's emerging homeland policy -
especially the pursuit of bantustan 'independence' - played a significant role in creating the need
for an Ndebele homeland. When the Nationalist party assumed power in 1948, independence
for the small and scattered African reserves had not even been contemplated. Although
Verwoerd's government sought to devolve, on a case-by-case basis, limited legislative and
executive functions to the bantustans, the granting of political independence to African areas
was still only considered a distant goal. However, following the swift passage of the Transkei
through the assigned stages of self-government, bantustan independence became an important
objective of homeland policy by the late 1960s. Legislation introduced hi 1970 and 1971
confirmed the goal of homeland independence and eased its implementation. As a result, by the
end of the 1970s, two homelands had already achieved what Verwoerd had once thought would
take decades. This step in the evolution of bantustan policy introduced several new dynamics
which were critical to the development of an Ndebele homeland.
First, in a pattern probably not anticipated by the South African government, the pursuit of
independence in the bantustans, particularly in Bophuthatswana, initiated what Deborah James
has described as a "domino effect" in ethnic relations. As a homeland opted for independence,
minority ethnic groups in the area often suffered discrimination and harassment in various forms,
usually in the context of education, business licensing or access to social benefits.24 By the late
1970s, tens of thousands of non-Tswanas were leaving Bophuthatswana, and especially the
ethnically diverse Odi-Moretele region, in an attempt to escape the escalating wave of
chauvinism and discrimination which had originated at the highest levels of the bantustan
government.25 Since many of Odi-Moretele1 s residents had been drawn to the area due to its
proximity to the PWV, KwaNdebele was a natural choice for those seeking a home still within
commuting distance to the Rand. By 1979, an estimated 10,000 individuals had moved to the
bantustan from the Winterveld area alone.26
A second consequence of the government's policy of homeland independence was a renewed
determination to clear 'white' South Africa of Tjlack spots'. There were both ideological and
material motivations behind this commitment. First, the mere existence of African-held land
outside of the bantustans belied the government's insistence that the latter areas were the true
and historical 'homes' of all Africans. Secondly, both to lure homelands to accept independence
and to justify the policy to apartheid's critics, the government wanted to consolidate the existing
bantustans into more sensible and coherent geographical units. In order to achieve this goal
without exceeding the quota of land set aside for African occupation hi the terms of the 1936
Land Act, the government wanted to remove outlying African-occupied areas (also called
'poorly situated' areas) and relocate their inhabitants to areas linked to the homelands. For
government planners, the displacement of thousands of Ndebele from 'black spots' across the
Transvaal further intensified the need for an Ndebele bantustan. Leaders of neighboring
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bantustans, already overcrowded, would not have accepted such large numbers of displaced
Ndebele without the provision of substantial extra land by the government. Perhaps the most
famous 'black spot' removal which involved KwaNdebele was the forced relocation of over
10,000 people from Doornkop and Kromkrans to resettlement camps in Siyabuswa in 1975.27
Finally, one should note that the decision to create an Ndebele homeland was ideologically
consistent with the government's decision to pursue independence, along ethnic lines, for the
country's African population. As the government increasingly justified its policies - and
continued white minority rule - through the rhetoric of self-determination and the 'separate
development1 of 'nations', it would have been difficult to continue to ignore the representations
of sectors of the Ndebele elite. I would argue, however, that this consideration was not
determinative of government policy. As we have seen, the officials of BAD consistently resisted
Ndebele requests for a homeland for over a decade after the first legislative declaration of
'national units' in 1959. If one accepts that the government's homeland policy, like apartheid
more generally, was not based upon a fully worked out 'master plan' or "blueprint',28 then I
believe the timing of KwaNdebele's creation supports the argument that larger material and
socio-economic dynamics were preeminent in determining government policy towards the
Ndebele. Furthermore, after the government's decision to recognize the Ndebele as an ethnic
group, not all of the Transvaal Ndebele were included in government plans to consolidate
KwaNdebele. A sizeable number of Ndzundza Ndebele and the vast majority of Northern
Ndebele were to be left in other homelands.
In sum, the government's recognition of KwaNdebele was not the final step in a 'grand
apartheid' plan, nor did it reflect a government ethnologist's belated 'discovery1 of another South
African 'tribe'. Rather, it reflected the government's attempt to control emerging socio-
economic and political realities in the region through the application of existing policy. In short,
in the mid-1970s, the creation of an Ndebele homeland was functional to the National Party's
political and economic goals.
Early Plans for the Consolidation of KwaNdebele
When BAD first released draft plans for an Ndebele homeland in September 1972, the site of
the bantustan was left open. At this stage the government had not decided whether to use the
Ndzundza land at Weltevreden or that in Nebo as the 'heartland' around which the homeland
would be consolidated,29 However, in April 1973, BAD issued 'final' plans for a homeland
located in the Weltevreden area.30 Meetings were subsequently held in July and September
1973 with representatives of the NTA and the three Ndebele tribal authorities in the
Hammanskraal region of Bophuthatswana in order to discuss the formation of an Ndebele
regional authority, the next step on the apartheid ladder to 'self-government1. In July 1974, the
NTA, enlarged to approximately 51,000 hectares by the addition of several adjoining farms, was
excised from Lebowa and granted the powers of a regional authority. In 1977, the three
Ndebele tribal authorities in Bophuthatswana were excised and incorporated into KwaNdebele
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in situ, without population removals, as the Mnyamana Regional Authority. Then, later in the
year, having established the requisite number of regional authorities, the government joined
them together in the South Ndebele Territorial Authority, thus officially constituting a
homeland. By 1979, the territorial authority was granted legislative assembly status with Simon
Skosana as chief executive councillor. In 1981, KwaNdebele became 'self-governing1, the
penultimate stage of political development on Pretoria's road to independence.31
However, the significance of these political steps towards the establishment of KwaNdebele pale
in comparison to the importance of a series of decisions regarding the spatial consolidation of
the homeland which were taken in the period 1972 to 1983. Ultimately, the decisions of various
commissions, committees and officials, when ratified by parliament, determined the future of the
homeland and, indeed, large parts of the surrounding central TransvaaL
In the early 1970s, a Parliamentary Select Committee on Bantu Affairs was appointed to
consider plans for the geographical consolidation of the various bantustans. As we have seen,
their report focusing on African areas in the eastern and northern Transvaal contained the first
official endorsement of an Ndebele homeland. A second report named Weltevreden, and its
Ndzundza inhabitants, as the nucleus for the bantustan. However, it was the 1975 consolidation
proposals which ultimately suggested the path that the homeland's development would take - a
course which eventually led to heated, sustained and widespread conflict in the coming years.
The government's consolidation efforts in the first half of the 1970s must also be considered in
light of shifts in the region's political economy as well as the evolution of the government's
homeland program discussed above. As the nature of the farming industry changed throughout
the 1960s, so too did prospects for government restructuring of land holdings in rural areas.
While previous governments had periodically tried to rationalize the "checkered mosaic of black
communities and white farmlands" to improve the carrying capacity of the former, the owners of
the latter had usually succeeded hi minimizing proposed consolidation efforts.32 However, as
farming methods changed, and labor needs declined accordingly, the government was finally in a
position to pursue more thorough consolidation. The opportunity for change further coincided
with emerging government policy. Not only did the logic of bantustan independence suggest
the need to consolidate the area of the existing homelands, but one after another, the officially-
recognized leaders of the bantustans demanded 'meaningful' consolidation and the addition of
more land before accepting government offers of further political devolution.
Against this background, the 1975 consolidation proposals were designed to achieve four
fundamental goals at the national level. In so far as the government deemed possible, the select
committee tried to decrease the number of separate bantustan pieces, eliminate 'black spots',
move 'poorly situated' scheduled and released areas, and fulfill but not exceed the quota of land
promised in the 1936 Land Act.33 In regard to KwaNdebele, the select committee
recommended the addition of 52,000 hectares immediately bordering Weltevreden which, when
implemented, would more than double the area of the existing homeland. However, most
importantly, the committee recommended that the three districts of Moutse should be excised
from Lebowa and incorporated into KwaNdebele. Although the proposal was not immediately
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In anticipation of Moutse's incorporation, the committee also recommended that farms at
Immerpan, an unoccupied block of land between Roedtan and Zebediela, be purchased as
compensatory land for Lebowa.37 In addition to its function as compensation, the government
planned to use the area as a relocation site for Moutse residents who refused to integrate into
KwaNdebele.
Following parhamentary approval of the 1975 plans, the land south of Weltevreden was duly
added to KwaNdebele's jurisdiction. Although Immerpan was subsequently purchased by the
SADT, the area was not immediately added to Lebowa, nor was it opened for settlement by
Moutse residents or anyone else. Interestingly, nothing at all seems to have been done in regard
to the excision and incorporation of Moutse. Gibson Mathebe, the Bantoane chief and chairman
of the Moutse Regional Authority, later stated that he was not even aware of the possibility of
excision until 1977. In September of that year he recalls that Greyling Wentzel, then Deputy
Minister of Co-operation and Development, first mentioned the possibility of excising the land
around the Philadelphia Hospital, the region's only hospital, located in Dennilton, Moutse.38
While it is impossible to know if this was the first public mention of excision by a government
official, what is beyond doubt is that neither the Moutse community nor its leaders were
formally informed of the 1975 decision to incorporate until late hi 1979. As we shall see, this
was an oversight which the government would later come to rue.
Consolidation Planning Under P.W. Botha
On February 7, 1979, P.W. Botha rose in Parliament to call for a reexamination of the
consolidation of the 'national states1.39 Stressing the need to speed up consolidation, Botha
established a Commission for Co-operation and Development to investigate the matter. He
further directed the commission to reconsider whether existing consolidation plans would assure
the desired 'freedom* of all the various groups hi South Africa. To assess progress towards this
goal, the Prime Minister specified that the commission should consider consolidation not only hi
terms of geography but also from the perspective of 'the consolidation of nations' and the
'economic consolidation of states'.40
Later in the year, a commission was duly appointed with the Deputy Minister of Co-operation
and Development Hennie Van der Walt as chairman. Subsequently, four regional committees
were appointed, each charged with examining consolidation matters hi separate areas before
making recommendations to the Commission at large. On November 16, 1979, Koornhof
announced the membership of the Central-Western Regional Committee which would examine
consolidation issues for QwaQwa and KwaNdebele. The committee later divided itself into two
sub-committees, each focusing on the consolidation of one of the homelands. The first meeting
of the committee for KwaNdebele consolidation was held in Pretoria on December 14, 1979.
Taking Botha's insistence on speed to heart, the group was instructed to submit a report with
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their recommendations for the region to the general consolidation commission by March 31,
1980.41
The committee relied on several sources of information to formulate their proposals. Firstly, the
committee's terms of reference specified that the consolidation decisions of 1975 were to be
used as the "the departure point" for their investigation. The suitability of the original proposals
were to be considered in light of specific guidelines issued to the regional committees by the
Department of Co-operation and Development (DCAD).
Secondly, through the local media, the committee solicited memoranda from parties interested
in KwaNdebele's consolidation. Although several documents were submitted, the only
memorandum cited at length in the final report was submitted by the Executive Committee of
the Ndebele Regional Authority in KwaNdebele. Citing Botha's call for the 'consolidation of
nations', the executive committee's submission stressed the desire of the Ndebele 'nation' for
unification. Rejecting the ethnological distinctions between Northern and Southern Ndebele,
the KwaNdebele officials called for an enlarged homeland which could accommodate 'one
inseparable nation'.42 Towards this end, the executive council submitted extravagant
consolidation proposals which would have required the addition of approximately three million
hectares at a cost of over two million rands.43 Needless to say, the consolidation committee's
final report largely ignored the regional authority's land proposals.
Thirdly, in a final bid to gather information, on January 10 and 11, the members of the
committee travelled to KwaNdebele and to three areas considered for incorporation, namely,
Moutse, the Mathanyana district of Bophuthatswana and nine Trust farms on the border of
Nebo (often referred to as the Zaaiplaats farms). The report, however, bears little sign that the
committee's field trip influenced their final conclusions. Moreover, there is no evidence that
members of the Moutse community or its recognized leadership were consulted in the course of
the visit.
While the committee members may have been unaware of popular opinion, they were certainly
well informed regarding the aims of the government. The guidelines issued to the regional
consolidation committees enumerated a number of wide-ranging principles to be followed. In
setting out the aim of the committees, the document's opening paragraph revealed the all-
encompassing nature of the goal:
To round off the consolidation of all the states within the historical boundaries of the
Republic of South Africa, so that their areas will be the most acceptable geographic,
political, ethnological, economic, agricultural and mineral bases for states, bearing in
mind the South African state's interests.44
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The DCAD realized that a decision-making process based on this many criteria would inevitably
result in a number of conflicts. Therefore, the committees were instructed, when faced with a
situation in which irreconcilable guidelines applied, to pursue "a method of optimization" by
which the "best" solution could be identified. In order to find the optimal solution, the
department reminded the committees of the need to prioritize the proffered guidelines. The
document suggested that "the most practical way of going about prioritizing is to honour the
highest priority until a point is reached at which other guidelines are no longer satisfied." At
this point, it was argued, decision-making would be constrained by those restrictions which
cannot not be ignored. Of course, what this method presupposed was a clearly established
hierarchy of priorities and a list of non-negotiable baseline restrictions. Neither was explicitly
offered in the departmental guidelines. Nevertheless, the discussion of various guidelines in the
body of the document implicitly suggested some principles for prioritizing.
The DCAD's guidelines included principles derived from traditional bantustan policy. However,
although still listed as important guidelines, many of these principles were now followed by new
qualifications. For example, the separate development of ethnic units, the stated goal of
government policy since at least 1959, was reaffirmed as current policy. Yet the document
emphasized that ethnic concentration was but "one of the determining factors for determining
borders." Furthermore, the department baldly stated that the "complete consolidation of all
members of a nation in their land by large-scale resettlement is regarded as unpractical1'45 The
principle of geographic consolidation, a main concern of the 1975 proposals, was also
reaffirmed, but similarly qualified. The guidelines stated that:
Although it may be regarded as desirable from a political point of view to consolidate
a state to a geographically linked area, it is more desirable from an economic point of
view for a state to contribute to the development of the area such that its economic
existence will profit from the move. This basic starting point does not represent the
necessary consolidation of a state to a geographically adjoining area.46
In sum, although the DCAD's document still cited ethnic and geographic criteria as factors to be
considered, they were no longer allowed to stand on their own. In fact, as the above quotes
suggest, other variables were increasingly being emphasized in the department's planning
calculus - particularly economic and administrative considerations. The report of the Central-
Western Committee for consolidation aptly illustrated the point.
Before revealing the committee's recommendations, the report listed the criteria, agreed upon by
the committee, which were used to evaluate various consolidation options. The first
foreshadowed the rest, stating that "consolidation should increase a state's viability."47
Although the report later noted that, "it must be accepted that not one of the National States,
and this includes KwaNdebele, can exist completely economically independent of the Republic
of South Africa," the committee immediately reaffirmed that "they must nevertheless attempt,
amongst other things, to make KwaNdebele economically viable."48 The remainder of the listed
criteria similarly highlighted economic, administrative and logistical considerations.
Revealingly, ethnic and historical factors were not even mentioned among the principles to be
considered.
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On this basis, the report concluded that, inter alia, both the Moutse and Mathanyana districts
should be excised from Lebowa and Bophuthatswana, respectively, and then incorporated into
KwaNdebele. In addition, a substantial tract of white-owned land was marked for purchase and
transfer to the bantustan. In all, the committee proposed to nearly quadruple the area of the
homeland to approximately 377,000 hectares in to taL^
Planning Moutse's Excision
Despite the emphasis which the government would later accord to the consolidation decisions of
the committee, the DCAD was not, in fact, passively waiting for the 'objeaive' pronouncements
of the committee before acting. Before, during and after the committee's meetings, department
officials were actively planning and negotiating Moutse's excision from Lebowa. In May 1978,
the DCAD requested the state ethnologist's office to comment on the Moutse area.50 The
response, written by C.V. Bothma, was not what we might expect.51 The report began in
conventional style, providing a detailed summary of the district's tribal and community
authorities, the farms they occupied and a rough estimate of the ethnic composition of each area
based on the 1970 census. However, the analysis which followed seems unusual. Rather than
providing a detailed recommendation for the consolidation of the area based on relevant
historical and ethnographic considerations, the report explicitly started from the premise that
Moutse would be excised from Lebowa and incorporated into KwaNdebele. In this and
subsequent reports, Bothnia's task was not to recommend how 'national units' could be
effectively consolidated. Instead, his reports highlighted problems which might arise in
executing existing consolidation proposals, reminded the government of previous commitments
to African leaders and reported the results of present and past negotiations with these leaders.52
In effect, Bothma and the state ethnological department served as trouble-shooters and risk
analysts in the DCAD's attempt to excise Moutse.
In his reports, Bothma stressed that the majority of Moutse's communities would not pose a
threat to DCAD plans to excise Moutse. Three of the region's primarily Northern Sotho areas
were summarily dealt with. The 1978 report stated that,
The removal of the Matlalas [in the Matlala Lehwelere and Matlala Mashung tribal
authorities and in the Keerom area] shouldn't present too many problems.
Notwithstanding the fact that they are small tribes, they are related to Chief Matlala,
the former chief minister of Lebowa, and can be directed to join his area.53
Bothma stressed that the residents of the farms Keerom, Doornlaagte, Driefontein and Spitspunt
were, in fact, already part of Chief Matlala's tribal authority in Nebo, which would therefore
simplify and ease the removal process. In a 1983 report, Bothma reported to the DCAD that
Chief Matlala had been waiting twenty years to exchange the two tribal farms and two trust
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farms in Moutse occupied by his subjects for farms bordering his area in Nebo.54 The analysis
further suggested that the Northern Sotho residents in the Rathdke area, although unrelated to
the Nebo Matlalas, could be removed just as easily: "The Sotho-minority [in Rathdke] also
shouldn't present any problems. They consist of small groups from various tribes and can either
trek back to their chiefs or incorporate with the Ndebele."55
In so far as the area's non-Sotho population was concerned, Bothnia was confident that they
could be relied upon to accept incorporation into KwaNdebele. Moutse's Northern Ndebele
population, particularly concentrated in the Rathoke area, were counted among those most in
favor of incorporation into KwaNdebele. Bothnia further assumed that "the Shangaan/Tsonga
of the district would be equally happy to be included into KwaNdebele or Lebowa," while
noting that the "Nguni" would prefer incorporation into KwaNdebele.56 In addition, both
reports stressed that the owners of private plots, no matter what their ethnic background, would
not be willing to sell their land and would, thus, accept incorporation into KwaNdebele without
resistance.57 In 1982, representatives of the Lekgotla la Bareki community authority, in the
course of discreet discussions, assured the KwaNdebele commissioner general and officials of
the DCAD that they had no objections to incorporation into the Ndebele bantustan. For
Bothnia, this was proof that Moutse's private land-owners, occupying 42% of the area's land,
would accede to the government's consolidation plans.58
Both of Bothnia's reports concluded that the real challenge to incorporating Moutse was posed
by the Bantoane tribal authority and the area's nearly 34,000 residents.59 As the 1983 report
stated:
The Bantoane tribe, the largest in the district, represents the eventual problem with
respect to the incorporation. It must be accepted that approximately 9,000 Ndebele
and other Nguni are only in the tribal area because they couldn't find any other place
to live. They would have no problem hi joining KwaNdebele. That reduces the
problem to the 24,000 Northern Sotho. The attachment of this tribe to their area, a
part of which they bought at the beginning of the century, insures that they will not be
willing to move. It can therefore also be expected that the tribe will vehemently resist
incorporation into KwaNdebele.60
Judging that at least the 24,000 'problem' Bantoane as well as the majority of their neighboring
Sotho-speakers would "probably trek," Bothnia's reports finally raised the importance of finding
land for these groups in Lebowa. Officials of the DCAD were, in fact, already working on the
issue.61
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In the second half of 1979, Piet Koornho£ the Minister of Co-operation and Development,
initiated a series of personal meetings with Chief Minister Cedric Phatudi and the Lebowan
cabinet. Although the stated aim of the meetings was "consultation" on consolidation issues,
the primary objective of the government was more immediate and particular. The DCAD
sought to secure Lebowa's acceptance of Moutse's excision and, in return, they promised
compensatory land at Immerpan. High-level negotiations were held in September, November,
June and October, 1980, without securing an agreement.62 Government documents later
recalled that over the course of the negotiations, Lebowa voiced "strong objections" to the
possible excision.63
On October 23, 1980, Dr. Phatudi organized another meeting with Deputy Minister Wentzel to
which Moutse community leaders, including the Bantoane Chief Gibson Mathebe, were invited
for the first time. For Phatudi, the meeting seems to have represented something of a
crossroads. The date of the meeting suggests that the Lebowan government knew of the
decisive proclamation which would be made by the State President the next day. If this was the
case, then the meeting served Phatudi's interests in two ways. Firstly, by drawing Moutse's
leaders into the negotiations, Lebowa strengthened its negotiating position vis-a-vis the DCAD.
Secondly, by calling for Moutse's participation in the proceedings, Phatudi hoped to
demonstrate to the Moutse leadership Lebowa's good faith and their opposition to the excision
plans.64
For his part, Chief Mathebe later recalled that the meeting was the first time that the Moutse
leaders learned of plans to incorporate their area into RwaNdebele. Previously, they had feared
that their area might be declared a 'black spot', which would have ultimately led to their
removaL To the Moutse leaders, the new information sounded little better. The meeting ended
with the fiat rejection of the plan by the Moutse delegates.65
Undeterred, on the next day, October 24, 1980, State President Viljoen published two
proclamations which officially excised Moutse from the jurisdiction of Lebowa and placed the
area under the direct control of the DCAD and the South African government. Although the
proclamations constituted a quick and easy fait accompli regarding the official excision of
Moutse, the DCAD's battle to incorporate the area into KwaNdebele was just beginning.
The Incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele
Soon after the government's unilateral proclamation of Moutse's excision, negotiations between
the DCAD, the Lebowa cabinet and the Moutse representatives resumed. However, as one
might expect, relationships were strained following the State President's pronouncement. At
their request, Chief Mathebe, his brother Godfrey Mathebe and Maredi Chueu (the latter were
Moutse representatives in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly) were granted another meeting with
Koornhof on November 6, 1980. Members of the Lebowa cabinet were also in attendance. At
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the end of the "heated" meeting, the Moutse representatives were still in doubt as to the ultimate
aim of the South African government. Mathebe recalled that "the incorporation into
KwaNdebele was not squarely raised and many persons at the meeting gained the impression
that it was the resettlement of the Moutse Community, and not its incorporation, which was at
stake." Again, the meeting concluded with the rejection of excision by the Moutse and Lebowa
delegations.66 It was the last meeting which was to be held for exactly a year.
The Lebowa and Moutse leadership tried to break the stand-off in late 1981. On October 23,
Phatudi suggested that Chief Mathebe and a delegation from Moutse should travel to Pretoria in
an attempt to meet with Koomhof Having arrived without an invitation, they were simply
turned away. Again, Phatudi stepped into the breach. Following discussions between the Chief
Minister and Koomhof the latter agreed to travel to Moutse in order to discuss the excision
with the Moutse leadership and the area's residents.
On November 6, 1981, Koornhoi; Wentzel and a delegation of South African officials attended
a mass meeting of an estimated 8,000 residents at Elandsdoorn, Moutse.67 Following Phatudi's
introduction, Koomhof rose to address the crowd and to explain the South African
government's policy. He began by assuring the residents that he was a friend of Moutse and
wanted to do everything in his power to help them. In the body of his speech, Koomhof
emphasized four points. Firstly, that the excision of Moutse had already been achieved and
therefore there should be no doubt that the area was under the jurisdiction of the DCAD.
Secondly, that the excision was undertaken only after a series of "discussions" with the cabinet
of Lebowa and the "Dikgose and leaders from Moutse," although, for the record, Koomhof
noted that "the Lebowa Cabinet at no stage expressed itself in favour of the excision." The
Minister promised that consultations would continue. Thirdly, Koomhof reminded the residents
of the government's provision of "compensatory land for Moutse" at Immerpan. Koomhof
mentioned the land several times and stressed the area's size, highly developed farms, arable land
as well as the government's commitment to make a range of services "available." Finally,
Koomhof assured the residents that there was no cause for worry, as no one would have to
move in the next year. In feet, he promised that anyone willing to stay in Moutse would be able
to do so. He concluded by confiding to the residents that nothing would please Him more than
to solve the Moutse problem.
Following the speech, several Moutse representatives and chiefs stood to challenge aspects of
Koomhof s statement. Chief Mathebe chided the Minister for refusing to say what was planned
for the Moutse area. The only thing mentioned, he pointed out, was the land at Immerpan.
Like many of the speakers who followed, Mathebe raised the issue of possible incorporation
into KwaNdebele by citing a recent newspaper article in which Skosana had claimed that
Moutse would fell under his homeland's jurisdiction from the beginning of 1982. In his
response, Koomhof relied on a tactic increasingly employed by the DCAD. In an attempt to
distance the department from decisions about Moutse's future, Koomhof emphasized that the
decision to include Moutse into KwaNdebele was made by parliament in 1975. He claimed that
his role was only to work with the Lebowa government to find a way of implementing the
decision. Koomhof had earlier even tried to personally distance himself from the process by
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claiming that "the decision to excise Moutse from Lebowa was taken by Parliament long before
I became Minister of Co-operation and Development."
With the close of the Elandsdoorn mass meeting, a period of government consultation also
ended. Although, Chief Mathebe approached the Lebowa Commissioner General to ask for a
follow-up meeting with Koomho£ it was never arranged. In fact, the Lebowa and Moutse
representatives were not invited for further discussions until March 1983. In the meantime, the
DCAD pursued a new line of "consultations."
In the same month that he addressed the Moutse residents, Koornhof appointed a committee to
make discreet inquiries to specific community and tribal authorities regarding their stand on
incorporation. The committee, which included the KwaNdebele Commissioner General and
members of the DCAD, selected its targets well. In January 1982, the minister's emissaries met
with representatives of the Northern Ndebele who occupied the Makeepsvlei farm in the
Rathoke area.68 The officials later reported that the community representatives were "eager"
for incorporation into KwaNdebele.69 Given the community's history, then- attitude was not
surprising. Although an offshoot of the Northern Ndebele living under Chief Fickson Kekana hi
the Zebediela region, the community had never been placed under his, or any other, tribal
authority. No doubt feeling left out of the spoils, the tribal head of Makeepsvlei had been
asking the government for recognition for years.70 Telling the government's representatives
what they wanted to hear hi 1982 could only help make his case. Not surprisingly, four months
after Moutse's eventual incorporation, the KwaNdebele Commissioner General met with the
same councillors to discuss the formation of the Amandebele-A-Moletlane Tribal Authority.71
Koornhof s delegates similarly met with councillors from the Lekgotla la Bareki Community
Authority later in January 1982. As we have seen, they too assured the officials that they would
not resist incorporation.72 Although it produced only a small fault line, the DCAD's efforts to
crack the united front of Moutse's elite had begun. Nevertheless, for a combination of personal,
political and financial reasons, the majority of Moutse's chiefs, councillors and legislative
representatives stood firm in their opposition to excision and incorporation.
Around this time, developments elsewhere in South Africa forced the DCAD to reconsider the
state of their ongoing negotiations for Moutse's incorporation. A 1982 court ruling nullified
Pretoria's excision of the Ingwavuma district of KwaZulu, largely on the grounds that the
government had not properly consulted the relevant parties prior to their decision to excise.
The DCAD were all too aware of the possible implications that the ruling might have for the
Moutse issue.
The DCAD's professed willingness to consult homeland officials on Moutse's future was not
limited to public pronouncements. Internal departmental documents painstakingly recited
government efforts to negotiate Moutse's transfer. However, after the Ingwavuma decision, the
DCAD suspected Moutse's excision was threatened, despite their on-going attempts to
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negotiate. As Lebowa's objections to Moutse's excision multiplied in the wake of the
Ingwavuma ruling, the department's doubts deepened. The worst was confirmed when they
learned that the Moutse community had received a private opinion from the same advocate who
had represented the Ingwavuma community in their case. In his view, the proclamation by
which Moutse had been excised would also, if challenged, be ruled invalid by the courts. The
State Prosecutor, when consulted by the DCAD, concurred with the advocate's interpretation.
Ironically, the problem that the ruling presented was not that Lebowa and Moutse had objected
to the excision when consulted, as the court had not ruled that "consultation" required
acceptance. Rather, the problem was that a firm decision to excise Moutse could be traced to
1975, when parliament accepted the consolidation proposals before it, years before government
"consultation" had even begun.73
Nevertheless, Koornhof attempted one last round of negotiations with representatives from both
Moutse and Lebowa. At a March 5, 1983 meeting in Pretoria, Koornhof clearly raised the issue
of Moutse's incorporation in the presence of the area's delegation for the first time. Perhaps he
hoped to secure their support, thereby forestalling legal challenge. However, as both groups
"strenuously rejected" the department's proposals, the meeting collapsed.74 After Koornhofs
failure to secure both parties' support, and in light of the Ingwavuma decision, the DCAD
decided to "discontinue consultation with tribes and communities in the Moutse district."75 The
department was forced to regroup. New and reformulated strategies soon emerged.
When the government restarted negotiations months later, they assumed both a new form and a
new justification. The changes were announced by P.W. Botha himself during his first visit to
the area which had become such a source trouble for his government. Formally responding to
Lebowa's invitation to come to Moutse, Botha met with the usual Moutse and Lebowa
representatives on November 18, 1983. Although the cast was familiar - aside from the new
and more powerful director - the script was not. At the meeting, Botha publicly rewrote the
South African government's role in the ongoing negotiations over Moutse. He announced that
his government considered the problem a conflict between the administrations of Lebowa and
KwaNdebele. Thus, he urged the two 'national states' to settle their disputes and resolve the
status of Moutse through negotiation. While emphasizing that South Africa was not a party to
the debate, he said that he would agree to help appoint an 'independent' mediator to aid the
necessary bilateral discussions of the bantustan governments.76
Although restructured, the negotiations which followed achieved little more than their
predecessors. If anything, the meetings, held under the chairmanship of Dr. P.S. Rautenbach,
assumed an even more formal and stilted character. Largely lacking the passion of previous
encounters - no doubt in part to the conspicuous absence of representatives from Moutse - the
meetings often consisted of an exchange of policy statements which did little to find common
ground. Numerous meetings over 18 months, from December 1983 until May, 1985 produced
no significant breakthroughs.
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What proved more successful for the South African government was a new round of discussions
with Phatudi. Although several meetings were held in the presence of the entire Lebowan
cabinet, the most rewarding were private discussions between the chief minister and high-
ranking South African ministers. The most important of the government's overtures to Phatudi
came on August 2, 1983. On that day, Phatudi met with both P.W. Botha and Piet Koornhof
The South African government had arranged the meeting, in large measure to try to deter
Phatudi from initiating legal action against the 1980 excision. Following another unsuccessful
meeting between Koornhof and the Lebowan cabinet on June 3, the DCAD knew that the
chances of litigation were increasing. A memorandum from the Director General of the DCAD
to Koornhof advised that the government "can't ignore the possibility that Lebowa will institute
court proceedings regarding Moutse." Aware that Lebowa had already solicited legal opinion,
the Director General warned that a "repetition of the Ingwavuma and Kangwane cases and
those results should be prevented."77 The government initiated a two-part strategy to ensure
that the Moutse incorporation would not falter as well.
Firstly, the government planned to introduce measures which, in the words of the Director-
General, would insure "that the legal standing of the Proclamation be placed beyond any
doubt."78 Thus, legislation was prepared which would secure the legal standing of Moutse's
excision by turning it into an act of parliament. Due to the principle of parliamentary
supremacy, the excision would then lie beyond the reach of the courts. Secondly, hi order to
buy time to secure the legislation's passage, the government hoped to reach an agreement with
Phatudi which would delay legal action until after the August parliamentary session. By which
time, of course, the DCAD's legal position would have been strengthened, perhaps even made
unassailable. Botha's meeting with the chief minister on August 2 achieved the necessary
respite.
Minutes from the meeting record that the State President agreed to undertake three tasks: (1)
to visit the Moutse district after the end of the parliamentary session scheduled to begin on
August 8. This was, in fact, the commitment which brought Botha to the meeting in Moutse
discussed above; (2) to pursue "in the meantime an in-depth investigation about the
consolidation, planning and regional development of Lebowa;" and (3) to continue with the "Bill
at present under consideration in the RSA Parliament ... in order to confirm the status quo (that
is the excision of the Moutse District from Lebowa and the administration of Moutse directly by
the Department of Co-operation and Development)... ." Botha did agree, however, to make
the bill's abolishment of Moutse's representation in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly
"permissive and subject to further negotiations." In exchange for these promises, Phatudi gave
Botha the time he needed. The minutes recorded that: "The Prime Minister gave these
undertakings on the express understanding that the Lebowa Government will not proceed with
its contemplated action against the Government of the Republic of South Africa about the
Moutse issue."79 Later in August, parliament passed the Laws on Co-operation and
Development Amendment Act, No. 112 of 1983. With the excision of Moutse legislatively
secured, the South African government now turned to insuring the area's incorporation into
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KwaNdebele. Although the evidence is patchy, it seems that the DCAD again turned to
discreet, at times secretive, negotiations in order to move the process forward.
In particular, much speculation has been focused on arrangements which Phatudi may have
made with the South African govemment. Oral interviews conducted by the author in the
Moutse area have consistently demonstrated a wide-spread belief among residents that Phatudi
was willing to agree to Moutse's excision and its incorporation in exchange for land elsewhere.
The citrus farms of Zebediela are frequently cited as the government's 'reward' to Phatudi for his
eventual acquiescence. One resident has said;
Well, as far as we were concerned, we thought that maybe Phatudi was once bought
off because he was no longer interested. We heard they made the exchange. He got
the orange field in Zebediela for us to be incorporated into KwaNdebele.80
An influential document written by the Transvaal Rural Action Committee repeats the
allegation, stating:
Finally in 1985, it would seem that the South African government managed to
persuade Chief Minister Cedric Phatudi of Lebowa to cede Moutse to KwaNdebele in
exchange for the Zebediela orange estates, a new railway line, some land at
Mokerong, and the Saliesloot and Immerpan resettlement camps ... .81
The documentary evidence I have examined does not definitively establish a Moutse-for-
Zebediela trade. Nevertheless, there are signs that the DCAD largely succeeded in their efforts
to tie Lebowa's further consolidation to their acceptance of Moutse's excision. For Phatudi, like
leaders of all the crowded and resource-strapped bantustans, offers of further land, no matter
what strings were attached, would have been hard to ignore.
Botha initiated a new round of negotiations on land at the August 2, 1983 meeting by promising
Phatudi "an in-depth investigation" into Lebowa's future consolidation and development. Of
course, Immerpan had already been publicly offered to Lebowa as compensation for Moutse.
Government documents show that behind the scenes DCAD officials wanted to make the area
as attractive to Lebowa as possible. One DCAD report noted that Moutse's proximity to job
opportunities would insure that few of the area's residents would actually take up the offer to be
resettled in Immerpan. Therefore, the document predicted that "Lebowa [would] get the area
virtually clean of people."82
As early as 1983, government documents were also indicating that the government might be
prepared to provide more land for Lebowa in exchange for Moutse. The same DCAD
document which reported Botha's undertakings to Phatudi in August suggestively noted that
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throughout the region for the next several years. The period of elite politics which this paper
has traced consequently drew to a close. Government commissions, public consultations and
private negotiations were quickly replaced by government repression, individual defiance, and
mass revolt. As resistance spread and casualties followed, Moutse and KwaNdebele flickered
for an instant into the popular consciousness of a nation already in crisis. For many,
KwaNdebele's creation and the strife over Moutse's incorporation were merely the latest
examples of the embattled government's irrationality. The narrative developed here, however,
qualifies this view. The government's policies towards KwaNdebele, as they developed over the
years, expressed no basic irrationality. Despite the government's rhetoric, and contrary to
Viljoen's quote which prefaces this paper, KwaNdebele was not created as a vehicle for
zealously 'bringing together* an 'ethnic nation'. Rather, the bantustan was a means for the
government to bring together - and control - those that its other policies had displaced,
removed or made surplus to the economy. Analyzed as an instrument of control, the real
questions regarding KwaNdebele's establishment and Moutse's incorporation were not the
rationality of the plans, but rather their effectiveness and practicality. The narrative developed
here has highlighted adjustments which government officials were making to traditional
homeland policy hi an attempt to make KwaNdebele functional to the state's interests. As a
result, by the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, plans for KwaNdebele were increasingly
concerned with consolidating the bantustan geographically, administratively and economically.
By the early Botha period, the DCAD's unstated but clear aim was to create, as far as possible,
an economically strengthened but still dependent homeland on the periphery of the PWV. Plans
calling for the incorporation of Moutse were followed pursuant to this goal. Ethnicity,
previously one of guiding principles of 'separate development', was largely ignored in the
process.
Ironically, the government's abandonment of the principle of ethnicity opened up new spaces of
contestation for the opponents of the apartheid state.88 In 1988, in a decisive case in the
Appellate Division, Chief Mathebe, on behalf of the Moutse residents, challenged the
government's proclamation incorporating Moutse into KwaNdebele. In the end, the government
was hoist on its own petard. Turning the state's traditional policy of 'separate development1
against it, the Moutse community's advocate argued that Moutse's incorporation into
KwaNdebele was invalid as it disregarded the ethnic identification of the majority of the area's
residents. The ploy worked. In its judgment, the Court ruled that under the existing legislation
it was impermissible for the State President to incorporate Moutse into KwaNdebele for
administrative or geographical reasons.89 Ultimately, the government's rational and calculated
attempt to modify one of the most important instruments of its hegemony - the bantustans -
was caught up in its own contradictions.
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Map of KwaNdebele, JMoutse and reiaiea
Adapted from the DCAD document, "Sakelys en Inligtingsdokuments" (Nov. 1983)
From the files of the Office of the State Ethnologist, Pretoria
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